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Polio eradication: a complex end game
Thomas Abraham examines the challenges of meeting the Global Polio Eradication Initiative’s
target of eliminating polio by the end of this year
Thomas Abraham director of public health communication programme
Journalism and Media Studies Centre, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Like the skipper of an ageing rust bucket trying to get to port
before the boat goes under, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative is ploughing through choppy seas in its effort to stamp
out polio and end a mission that began more than two decades
ago. As the vessel lurches uncertainly on, a Greek chorus of
commentators has raised questions about everything from the
choice of vaccine and the technical strategies the campaign has
used to the very wisdom of pursuing the goal of eradication.
These questions are important because they cast light on the
long and tortuous route that the polio eradication programme
has followed since 1988, when the World Health Assembly
passed a resolution declaring it was committed to eradicating
polio by 2000. That deadline and a subsequent one have been
missed, and a third deadline of the end of 2012 will probably
be missed as well. Eradication seems both tantalisingly close
and elusively distant. As it becomes harder to maintain the
funding and government engagement necessary to keep the
campaign going at the frenetic pace it has kept for several years
now, there is a danger that the gains made over the past two
decades will be lost, and the poliovirus, largely confined to
pockets in South Asia and western and central Africa, will again
entrench itself across swathes of the globe.⇓⇓
The initiative’s key partners—WHO, Unicef, US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Rotary International, and the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation—have responded by
increasing pressure on governments in polio affected countries
to intensify their immunisation and surveillance efforts.
However, the response has been faltering because of difficulties
such as underdeveloped health systems, poor governance, and
chronic security problems.
On paper, the polio eradication campaign still aims to eradicate
transmission of wild poliovirus by the end of 2012. But as the
IndependentMonitoring Board (IMB), a group of experts formed
two years ago to evaluate and guide the programme, stated
earlier this year, the campaign is “not on track to meet this goal.”
The board has suggested changes in strategy and execution to
try to get back on track.
Both the polio campaign and the IMB have maintained that the
world has to push ahead and complete eradication as soon as
possible or face a resurgence of polio to the levels that existed
before the campaign began. The IMB declared in its most recent
report “The Global Polio Eradication Initiative has just two
possible outcomes. Polio will be eradicated from the world, or
it will not. The programme will succeed spectacularly, or fail
monumentally.” The IMB points out that it costs roughly $1bn
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(£628m; €750m) a year to contain polio at its current low levels
and argues that “if the eradication effort does not succeed soon,
this funding will dry up.” It warned that “failure would unleash
the virus, paralyzing hundreds of thousands of children. This
prospect seems unthinkable.”
In response to these concerns, the World Health Assembly, the
annual gathering of the WHO member countries, will discuss
a resolution in May declaring polio a “programmatic
emergency”—a move that will help focus global attention on
polio eradication.
While polio campaigners have maintained a steady drumbeat
of advocacy about the urgency of completing eradication and
delivering a polio-free world, other voices fromwithin the world
of public health and without, have raised fundamental questions
about the wisdom of focusing so much attention on a single
disease without paying equal attention to strengthening health
systems in general and, in particular, whether polio eradication
is feasible in contexts where health systems are unable to deliver
routine immunisations for other vaccine preventable childhood
diseases.
Cat and mouse game
Transmission of polio can be interrupted through intense vaccine
campaigns based around national and subnational immunisation
days and supplementary immunisation campaigns, but to stay
polio free requires a robust routine immunisation programme.
As Yemane Berhane and colleagues have pointed in the context
of Nigeria, while campaign style immunisation might be
sufficient to temporarily stop polio transmission, “without a
functioning immunisation system, Nigeria will remain at risk
for renewed transmission and will continue to pose a risk to
other countries.”1
The absence of robust routine childhood immunisation systems
makes countries where polio has been stamped out vulnerable
if the disease is imported, as has happened in countries
surrounding Nigeria. Thus in 2001, Chad was being
congratulated for ending polio transmission. But because routine
immunisation systems were weak, cases coming in from across
the border were able to re-establish the disease, and at the end
of 2011 Chad had the largest number of cases per million
population of any country in the world. Similarly, Angola had
been polio free from 2001 till 2007, when an imported case led
to an outbreak in the capital Luanda which spread to other
districts in the country, as well as to the Democratic Republic
of Congo, where it is now entrenched.
This cat and mouse game of intense campaigns in countries
without robust immunisation systems is not a sustainable long
term strategy and was not part of the original vision for polio
eradication. The 1988World Health Assembly resolution calling
for eradication by 2000 regarded the polio campaign as one
component of the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI),
which was launched in 1974 and had the goal of universal
immunisation of children by 1990 for diphtheria, tetanus,
pertussis, measles, polio, and tuberculosis. This immunisation
programme was part of WHO’s vision of achieving “health for
all” by 2000. The resolution specifically mentioned that polio
eradication was to be carried out in ways which strengthened
the EPI, health infrastructure, and primary healthcare. This was
in keeping with WHO’s global health philosophy of the time,
which saw overall strengthening of health systems as the main
way to achieve better health outcomes, as opposed to individual
disease eradication programmes.
But as the deadlines slipped by and funding became more
uncertain, the polio campaign took on a life and rationale of its
own. While this helped advocacy and fund raising, it has had
other consequences as well.
The consequences of the separation between the polio
programme and routine childhood immunisation is perhaps best
illustrated by the fact that the countries where routine
immunisation for other childhood diseases are the weakest, tend
to be the countries where polio persists. If we use the extent of
DTP3 (three doses of diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis)
immunisation as a measure of routine childhood immunisation
in a country, we find a relation between low childhood
immunisation rates and the persistence of polio.WHO estimates
that in 2010, roughly 19 million children in the world had not
received DTP3 in routine immunisation programmes during
their first year of life.2 Half of these children lived in Nigeria,
India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Nigeria
and the Democratic Republic of Congo have persistent
poliovirus transmission, and India has only recently managed
to stamp out polio, after great difficulty. The two other countries
where polio persists, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are among the
10 countries that contain the bulk of children who have not had
routine DTP immunisation.
The weakness of routine immunisation services both in the
countries where polio persists, and in countries that are
vulnerable to fresh outbreaks, makes eradication difficult but
still possible. The 99% decrease in polio cases since the
eradication campaign was launched demonstrates this. But once
wild polioviruses are eradicated, and eradication is certified,
another complication will have to be dealt with.
New risks
One of the paradoxes of the polio eradication programme is that
even after wild polioviruses are eradicated, cases of
poliomyelitis caused by the viruses derived from the oral polio
vaccine are likely to continue for some years. The attenuated
Sabin strain virus used in the oral polio vaccine can revert to a
virulent state, and it transmits as easily and causes disease as
severe as the wild poliovirus. In 2011, there were 58 cases of
disease caused by a circulating vaccine derived virus. Of these,
34 cases were in Nigeria, from a chain of transmission that
began in 2005.3
These 58 cases could be viewed as an acceptable risk compared
with the 650 cases caused by the wild poliovirus in 2011
globally. But as the number of polio cases caused by wild
poliovirus reduces, the relative risk posed by vaccine derived
viruses and vaccine associated paralytic polio will rise. To
reduce this risk, the eradication initiative has suggested that use
of the oral vaccine should stop globally around five years after
certification is achieved. But population immunity will still need
to be maintained against residual circulating vaccine derived
viruses. This will require either monovalent live vaccines or
injectable inactivated vaccines. There is no indication of how
long immunisation will have to be continued after the eradication
of wild polioviruses, or how much it will cost.
Though the 2012 target for eradicating wild poliovirus still
stands, nobody can predict whether it will be met. But it is clear
that eradication will be a long drawn out process that is more
complex than indicated by the simplistic advocacy messages of
the eradication initiative and will cost more than the $2.13bn
that it has budgeted for till the end of 2013. Nevertheless, it
remains an important public health goal.
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